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IN THIS ISSUE . . .

. . . Theodore T. Thienemann charts a course for the Christian counselor through the troubled waters of present-day psychology. The paper presented here was originally read at the annual meeting of the Society of Phi Alpha Chi, Gordon College and Divinity School.

Dr. Thienemann has published extensively in philosophy, comparative literature, linguistics, and psychology. He is a former member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and is now a member of the Linguistic Society of America. He received the Ph.D. from the University of Budapest in 1913 and after several teaching posts elsewhere became Dean of the Faculty of Liberal Arts at Budapest. In 1944, he resigned after his refusal to take the Nazi oath of allegiance. He subsequently held educational posts in Brussels and Stockholm.

He came to Gordon College in 1948 and is now Professor of Psychology and Modern Languages. His office for guidance and counseling is at 334 Beacon Street, Boston.

. . . Philosophy probes the practical problems of church music in an article by Arthur F. Holmes, Assistant Professor of Bible and Philosophy at Wheaton College. A graduate of Wheaton, he returned for the M.A. in theology, and received the Ph.D. in philosophy from Northwestern University, writing on "The Realistic Argument in Twentieth Century English and American Epistemology." He has taught at Wheaton since 1951.

Dr. Holmes has published articles in *His*, and is a member of the Evangelical Theological Society and the American Philosophical Association. A native of England, he served in the Royal Air Force from 1942 to 1947.

. . . James O. Buswell, III, advances the claims of anthropology to a place in both the vocational and the liberal arts curricula. After graduating from Wheaton College, he received his M.A. from the University of Pennsylvania (thesis: "An Introduction to Ethnolinguistics"), taught at Shelton College for six years, and returned to Wheaton in 1954 as Instructor in Anthropology. He has pursued other graduate studies at the Summer Institute of Linguistics and at Columbia University.

Mr. Buswell is a Fellow of the American Scientific Affiliation and has contributed regularly to its *Journal*. He is also a member of the American Anthropological Association, the Central States Anthropological Society, the American Association of Physical Anthropologists, and the Society for Applied Anthropology.

(Continued on page 132)

I

Counseling is not simply a technique. It is an art, a specific form of spiritual creativity. We are not satisfied with being Christian in one aspect of life and being psychologist or counselor in another. Our goal is to search for the basic principles of Christian counseling. Therefore we shall try to clarify the relationship as it exists today between psychology and counseling on the one hand, and the teaching of Christ on the other.

We are witnessing an upsurge of psychological interest in recent years. The psychological approach has become more widely accepted than ever before — not only in medical science, in the so-called psychosomatic medicine, but even more so in industry, business promotion, advertising and even the technical field of communication. We have reason for rejoicing that amid our technical age with its material interests predominant the non-material aspect of man has been rediscovered. However, we must also realize that this non-material aspect of man, the spiritual man, appears in the light of this new psychology as just an object, an item of the labor market, like any other commodity, machine or electronic automaton, which can be fitted to the needs of the market, which can be advertised, bought and sold in accordance with the standards of the competitive economy. The positive increase of interest in psychology does not necessarily indicate a revival of the spiritual man.

Two trends can be clearly recognized in the rapid progress of psychology. One trend can be broadly called analytical psychology, the other behavioral psychology. We must be aware at the very outset that neither psychoanalysis nor behaviorism is simply a scientific psychological doctrine: both represent a philosophy of man which tries to encompass man in the totality of culture. Contradictory as these two schools of psychology are in almost all their doctrines, they agree in some basic principles — just those principles which can hardly be accepted on evangelical-biblical grounds.

Both schools of psychology agree in one point: they do not speak of the soul of man, they deal with the mind or with *psyche*. In other words, they consider this mind to be a subtle mechanism built in the human brain and nervous system. It makes little difference whether or not this mechanism is considered as a conscious or an unconscious one. A mechanism is a machine, and we have good reason to believe that man is not a machine. A machine can be taken apart and then put together again, thus can be known completely from inside out; and the machine

does not change during this process of analysis and synthesis; it remains the same. One cannot do the same with man. The knowledge of our own self and of our fellow men cannot be reduced to the principles of mechanics. The popular principle that man is a composite of body, mind and spirit is not in accordance with the Christian philosophy of man. We believe that man is created in the image of God and became a living soul. To split this living soul into mind and spirit in order to exclude the spirit from the mind — in other words, to exclude the spiritual aspect from psychological counseling — cannot be justified on practical grounds nor on biblical grounds. We must then ask: what is this basic anxiety of man, what is the fear of loneliness, what is the concept of sin, guilt, repentance and forgiveness, what is the fear of death — is it a question of the mind or a question of the spirit? Or remaining more in the practical sphere: what is the desire to be loved and accepted, what is the incapacity to love our neighbor, what is the cynical loss of all reverence and respect for the great mysteries of life and death — is all this a mental or a spiritual problem? Obviously these are not simply medical problems, symptoms of a sickness which can be treated by medical means. These problems concern the whole existence of man. These are religious-ethical problems as well as medical problems. They concern the living soul of man. These are all problems of Christian counseling.

II

The recent increase of psychological interest is primarily the consequence of the popular success of the psychoanalytical philosophy. The impact of psychoanalytical thinking can be felt far beyond the boundaries of the proving ground of psychoanalysis proper. Therapeutic counseling in particular became dependent upon psychoanalytical principles. I would like to point out three of the differences which separate the psychoanalytical approach to man from the Christian one.

(1) One difference is very obvious. According to the psychoanalytical doctrine the basic disturbance of our age is the consequence of repression and frustration of our instinctual desires. This doctrine tacitly supposes that in case the instinctual desires of man were not frustrated but fully satisfied then no neurosis would come and man would be perfectly happy and healthy. As a matter of fact, experience proves the opposite. The complete satisfaction of all instinctual desires can be found very seldom in reality: this free outlet of instincts is best approximated on the lowest, almost animal level of human culture on the one hand and on the highest top level of capitalistic wealth on the other. Its result is not as we should expect from Freud's theories, a state of sanity and happiness, but neurosis, apathy and boredom. A man who has every-

thing and can do everything he desires will not become happy but rather will lose the sense of value, he will suffer the *taedium vitae*, or *languor* as the Romans called it, the vanity and emptiness of all existence. He will experience the symptoms of a life without faith: insecurity, anxiety and guilt. His life, his love, his work, his associations, even his despair will become meaningless and boring. This is the most general, so to speak the social, sickness of a highly developed culture. The "discontent in culture" as Freud called it is not the consequence of the frustration of instinctual desires; it is rather the consequence of saturation so that there is nothing left to be desired. Those children who have all the toys they want are not the happiest or the healthiest children. The psychoanalytical doctrine never will find the answer to this general loss of meaning, but we know the answer. There is one remedy for the despair, estrangement, and loneliness: this is man's reconciliation, reunification with God through our Redeemer Jesus Christ. If man arrives at the point (it is a long, long journey) where he can honestly pray, "Not my will but thine be done"; if he has overcome all his selfish egocentric tendencies — then he will not feel alone and forsaken any longer.

(2) There is another point of difference. The psychoanalytical situation supposes a polarity between the patient lying on the couch and the analyst sitting behind the couch invisible to the patient. The patient is supposed to speak to reveal the most intimate secrets of his heart; the analyst shall remain hidden in silence. From this situation a tension must result between the sick patient and the analyst. In a more general sense this holds true for the whole psychoanalytical literature. They have laid upon their analytical couch humanity as a whole, uncovering the repressed secrets of every man; exempt from this analytical exposure remain only the psychoanalysts themselves. Freud's personality is a mystery compared with his analyzed patients described in his case studies. Other great psychologists, like Augustine, Pascal, Kierkegaard, exhibited themselves in order to show that which is human — "all too human," as Nietzsche, another great psychologist, said. The psychoanalyst does not show the same respect for his neighbor he shows for his own person.

The Christian situation is different. It does not suppose the one-sided transference but is based upon mutual acceptance and respect for one another. We can trust only if we are trusted, we can love if we are loved, we can speak and reveal ourselves if there is a response and our partner is willing to do the same. Counselor and counselee are equally partner and equally saved by the love of our Lord. The Christian situation supposes *sympathy* in the original sense of this word, the willingness to suffer together, to share the burden of life together. Sympathy

implies love and identification; it will result in understanding and knowledge. A mother understands her child by this immediate identification without analysis; husband and wife can be sensitive for one another's feeling, for the slightest emotional changes, because they know and trust one another.

(3) There is a general difference between understanding and explaining. The immediate grasp of understanding comes from love, sympathy and identification; on the other hand explanation involves rational thinking in terms of cause and effect. The psychoanalyst tries to explain, the Christian counselor tries to understand his fellow man. We know too well from everyday experience that there are phenomena understood which we are not able to explain, but there are also people who can explain much but understand little. But this leads us to more general observations on the rapid increase of interest in psychology. We must ask ourselves: is this general popularity of an analyzing psychology not a social symptom of a society in which the true Christian love and sympathy for our neighbor is diminishing? Is this objective analysis and exposure of man not an indication that the living soul is treated as a dead object, that there is a lack of constructive love and identification with our fellow man? And the basic problem of all analytical counseling is this: does the rational insight into one's own personality really help to overcome those morbid symptoms, is the neurotic patient really accessible to the clarity of logical thinking, is the analytical recalling of past memories really a therapy or remedy for those anxious feelings of inadequacy and guilt and hopelessness which can make life so miserable? The healing process supposes a total change of personality, a conversion, a rebirth of man — all beyond the limits of analytical psychology.

III

I turn now to the other main trend of present-day objective psychology. This is the psychology of behavior and adjustment. While some basic principles of psychoanalysis can well be adopted in the practice of Christian counseling, I see little or no common ground with the behavioral psychology. It is perhaps not important that these words "behavior" and "adjustment" hardly can be found in the Bible, but it is indicative that the underlying ideas contradict the biblical position. The pharisees and hypocrites so vehemently condemned by Christ seem to be, from the behavioral viewpoint, perfect. The intentional ethics of Christ which emphatically asserts that one can commit adultery even in case of spotless outside behavior reveals the fallacy of all behavioral psychology.

Adjustment originally meant "making just" — but this making just does not refer to the justification of man by faith; it means the justifica-

tion of man by conforming to the public opinion. If we hear from all quarters of this behavioral philosophy: "Adjust yourself, adjust, comply with the majority, with the greatest number, with the average," then we must realize that the average is a mathematical concept necessarily referring to a quantity which can be expressed in figures and numbers. The individual man is not simply a quantity; the living soul is a quality, which cannot be converted into figures and numbers or expressed in mathematical terms. The implication of this adjustment psychology is always the advice, "Comply with the given social standard, do the same as the others do, and you will be satisfied and happy." But the question remains unanswered whether or not this social average standard to which the individual should surrender is itself adjusted or justified according to the highest standard given by the Lord. To be "normal" means in our language of today to be like the majority of people are; it does not mean to be justified before the highest ideal norm of behavior.

This prevailing psychology has resulted in the social well-adjusted man, who is normal in the sense of average, who is therefore successful on the market, but who is always imitating what the others do, a man whose whole life is nothing but routine, who has to look always right and left but never can look into his own self, who will be finally adjusted or fitted to everyone, but not adjusted to his own true and real self. A man who is always what others expect him to be can never find the expression of his own productive capacities. A growing discontent and dissatisfaction will be the result of a life which is nothing but routine, standard and average. Against this behavioral doctrine of the well-adjusted social man we hold the simple Christian doctrine that the Lord has wanted this special individual to become a living soul. The Lord has a purpose for my life, the Lord knows me as an individual by name, and I have to give account of what I have done as an individual with my life. In the behavioral psychology there is no place for the conscience, for the realization of our failures or the fact that we always will fall short before the ideal absolute norm. Conversion means, in this philosophy of the crowd, the final adjustment to the given relative social majority.

IV

What now is the contribution which our Christian faith can offer on the face of all these contradictory psychological teachings? Jesus in his human life surely does not represent the archetype of the socially well-adjusted man; nor does he analyze his followers. He came as theaviour (which means Healer) who identified himself with man because he loved man, even the lowest outcasts of the human race. He imparted to us the simple psychological truth that there is a tremendous power implicit in love, which is able to transform the total personality: love

may have an exhilarating and healing effect. Christ did not use the highly technical language of our age, he did not speak about schizophrenia or paranoia, but he used the simple language of a given cultural setting. Psychoanalysis elaborated the doctrine that all neurosis derives finally from repressed, forgotten traumatic experience of early infancy. Our Lord did not use such terms as psycho-trauma, but he led a small child into the midst of his disciples, took the small child in his arms and said, warning: "Whosoever offend a small child is guilty of a great crime," and he added, "It were better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck and that he were drowned in the depth of the sea" (Matt. 18, Mark 9, Luke 18). We know that such an offense of the small child may later on develop into *depression*, and as this word describes it, the *depressed* person moves around slowly and suffers from an extreme fatigue as if he were carrying an invisible millstone around his neck.

Immediately after this lifting up of the small child we can observe one of those instances when Christ is consulted (Matt. 19, Mark 10, Luke 18). It is pointed out that the man who came was a young man, very rich, a ruler; his whole approach shows some signs of immaturity. He came running and kneeling down to ask his great question: "Good Master, what shall I do that I shall inherit eternal life?" Here we can see a case when a man of the highest social class is driven by anxiety. He has inherited wealth and social position, but he wants more: he wants to inherit eternal life. He addresses Jesus as "Good Master." There is no talk about "transference," the shift of the qualities of the father to the counselor, but Jesus corrects at once this little verbal symptom and says: "Why callest thou me good? There is none good but one, that is, God." This young man is driven by anxiety, he wants to find eternal security, but Christ turns his wishful thinking toward the reality by saying to keep the commandments, and the most difficult commandment: love thy neighbor as thyself. The young man replied, "All these have I observed since my youth." "Then Jesus beholding him loved him." The young man is a perfectionist; he cannot rid himself of his basic anxiety. Jesus said: "If thou wilt be perfect go and sell what thou hast and give to the poor."

We know that the young man went away "sorrowful." It is not in the purpose of Christ's counseling to make the counselee immediately happy. We all know that many young men who expect from the counselor the affirmation of their wishful thinking, if turned down to the hard facts of reality go away sorrowful if not resentful. But Christ has a last word to say to his counselee, and this is the final word of all Christian counseling. Christ says: "Follow me." Happy is the counselor who can look into the face of his counselee and honestly can say: "I follow Christ. Follow Him too! Then we shall follow Him — together."

ANTHROPOLOGY IN THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE

JAMES O. BUSWELL, III

I. Introductory

Anthropology courses in Christian schools should have the following as three of their primary objectives: (1) To emphasize as its primary applied function the exceedingly important roles anthropology plays in (a) the training of missionaries and prospective missionaries in an understanding of the profound cultural implications and the far-reaching social, as well as spiritual changes resulting from the propagation of the Gospel among foreign peoples; (b) providing within the context of Christian absolutes, an objective appraisal and understanding of relative cultural values and racial differences, breaking down preconceived notions of racial inequality and ethnocentrism. (2) To cover adequately the normal academic scope of the subject of each course at a scholastic level equal at least to that of the existing secular educational standards. (3) Using scientific data from the study of prehistoric human cultural and physical remains, and a thorough examination of present-day evolutionary theory, to provide a supplementary frame of reference for a scholarly system of apologetics.

Partly due to the recency of its establishment as a recognized science, and partly because of the inevitable association of its subject matter with either exotic non-essentials or with atheistic notions, anthropology has never enjoyed un-biased acceptance in Christian circles. Its treatment has been characterized by everything from mild curiosity to active hostility.

Robert B. Taylor has written, "One of the biggest tasks for the Christian professional anthropologist . . . is the demonstration of anthropology's relevance to Christianity."¹ Elsewhere he has pointed out that "anthropology, as the science of man, has as much importance for Christian thought and behavior as any academic discipline, and perhaps more."² These important and unique educational values, the integrative scope, and the broadening outlook, have been screened behind the likewise unique but often emotion-laden subject matter.

It is almost impossible to conduct a dispassionate discussion of prehistoric man, racial equality, or the social impact of the Gospel, in the Christian classroom. But behind these areas of controversy lies a science of human physical and cultural description and history whose values for the Christian scholar, though vast indeed, are barely beginning to be realized.

It is therefore necessary to present these values in such a way as to

1. Robert Taylor, "Obstacles and Opportunities for Christian Anthropologists," *Practical Anthropology*, II (1955), 30.

2. Robert Taylor, "On the Use of Anthropological Materials by Christians," *Practical Anthropology*, II (1955), 1.

broaden the realization of their relevance to and vital role in Christian education. Robert W. Ehrich has observed that "Anthropology is a latecomer . . . to the vested interest arena of the academic disciplines, and it must make its way within an already established framework."³ This is even more true in Christian education than in the secular academic world. The values of cultural anthropology are dealt with in this paper. A discussion of the role of physical anthropology for the Christian may be found elsewhere.⁴

II. Vocational Values: Missionary Training

With its emphasis upon field work, anthropology produced a strong necessity for accurate observation and description. The anthropologist has been taught to see man as a whole—to examine the factors influencing every aspect of his behavior. This was only possible in a primitive society where one man could have some chance of learning "all" about it within a reasonable length of time.

This resulted in one of anthropology's greatest assets, the comparative point of view. With the examination of many cultures the comparative point of view became basic for all anthropological generalizations. One didn't base one's theories upon the observations of one society. One no longer based one's conclusions or judgments upon the standard of one's own society. This was one of Freud's fundamental errors. The comparative point of view enabled Malinowski to overthrow some of Freud's psychological generalizations upon the basis of a cross-cultural study of the allegedly universal Oedipus complex.

Thus, essentially, the Christian anthropologist maintains the necessity of the missionary's distinguishing between what is the absolute in Christianity and thus applicable to all peoples, and the cultural trappings which usually enshroud its presentation as it is superimposed upon various primitive societies. The purely cultural, and therefore relative, aspects of Christianity are the areas in which frequent conflicts and difficulties lie.

According to C. M. Arensberg,⁵ anthropology is vitally interested in two things which apply directly to the whole missionary enterprise, namely the description of cultural change, and the isolation of the principles which control it, which restrict it, and which hasten it. This is different from the historian's concern with the changes themselves. The world is full of case, not only of internal cultural change, but, more important, of acculturation or the impact of one culture upon another. Christian missions constitute one of the most important, far-reaching, and sustained examples of such

3. Robert W. Ehrich, "Anthropology in the Liberal-Arts Curriculum," *Journal of Higher Education*, XXV (1954), 362.
4. J. O. Buswell, III, "Anthropology and the Study of Evolution," *Journal of the American Scientific Affiliation*, VI (Sept. 1954), 5-8.
5. C. M. Arensberg, "Applied Anthropology," *Human Organization*, IX (Fall 1950), 4.

processes. Every foreign missionary is, whether he knows it or not, an agent of acculturation.

The cultural repercussions are tremendous. More than that, they are not usually able to be identified until too late to "do" anything about it. Anthropology provides the skills with which to pre-examine and prevent needless cultural disintegration due to factors of acculturation. And in the tracing of these factors the anthropologically trained missionary is in a position to understand and cope with, or administer, or otherwise deal with the changing culture in terms derived from its own distinctive character. Such a cultural context is to a very large degree, unknown to, ignored, or otherwise misunderstood by those who would attempt to deal with the changing situation upon the basis of its existing form alone without reference to the antecedents of contact. Even more disastrous is the result when adjustment is attempted in terms of "previous experience" in like situations—in one's own culture.

For the applied anthropologist, as for the missionary, the situations tending to come under his scrutiny are largely experimental ones, and in the widest of cultural contexts. Arensberg has written that

in business and industry, in government, in psychiatry and social work, (and we may well add, in Christian missions,) the question is constantly being asked: "The situation seems to be thus; suppose we do so and so, what will happen?" In all of these areas experiments are being made daily, and, whether explicitly or not, they are experiments in human relations. It is here that the applied anthropologist finds his laboratory. . . .⁶

Thus, although as applied to the mission field anthropology for the Christian becomes primarily vocational, we find that it provides the Christian student with techniques for evaluation and strategy in dynamic social situations not only where cross-cultural considerations are concerned, but also for the application of the same techniques—cross-culturally validated—to a wide variety of professional interests in his own society.

Once the missionary has an understanding of the nature of cultural change, has achieved a comparative or relative cultural viewpoint, and is able to discriminate between cultural and supercultural⁷ Christianity, the next vital contribution anthropology offers is the teaching of how to effectively *communicate* the gospel to another—not necessarily a primitive—culture in terms of that culture's own idiom, customs, and system of values.

Dr. Eugene Nida writes that

a close examination of successful missionary work inevitably reveals the correspondingly effective manner in which the missionaries were able to identify themselves with the people—"to be all things to all

1. Loc. cit.

2. An able treatment of this distinction may be found in Wm. Smalley and M. Fetzner, "A Christian View of Anthropology," in *Modern Science and Christian Faith* (Wheaton, Ill., 1950), pp. 101-105.

men" — and to communicate their message in terms which have meaning for the lives of the people. Conversely, where missionary work has been singularly unsuccessful, one will always find a failure to resolve the missionary's two great problems: identification and communication. Successful missionary work should not be judged simply as a question of the number of converts, but of an integrated, self-propagating church, adjusted to the problems and needs of the surrounding culture. . . .⁸

In 1924 Edwin W. Smith, missionary, and later president of the Royal Anthropological Society, wrote, "I should like to see the science of social anthropology recognized as an essential discipline in the training of missionaries."⁹

I would like to quote here a few more passages from this same article which could be duplicated many times in the words of earlier and more recent authors alike.

Social anthropology might almost be claimed as a missionary science, first, on account of its great utility to missionaries, and second, because the material upon which it is built has so largely been gathered by them.

. . . One might even go further and say that this study throws considerable light upon our own civilization and religion and should therefore be of use to all clergymen and ministers.

. . . My point is that a study of social anthropology will lead the young missionary to look at things always from the native's point of view, and this will save him from making many serious blunders. Tact is not enough; nor is love. Robert Morrison loved the Chinese, but love did not prevent his throwing into the fire a piece of paper upon which his Chinese teacher had written some words for him to memorize, and thereby deeply offending the man's feelings. Had Morrison known the sentiments of the Chinese as to paper upon which words of their language are written or printed — had he known of Yuen Liao Fan and the society founded by him three hundred years ago for the Prevention of the Misuse of Paper bearing Chinese Characters, I am sure he would not have offended. The dictionary defines tact as "an intuitive perception of what is fitting" but the most tactful of Britons might automatically throw a piece of paper into the fire without realizing the unfitness of his action. Tact needs to be based on knowledge; love there can hardly be without understanding.

Dr. Smith then quotes from a report drawn up by the British Association:

"An accurate acquaintance with the nature, habits and customs of alien populations is necessary to all who have to live and work amongst them in any official capacity, whether administrators, executive officers, missionaries or merchants, because in order to deal effectively with any group of mankind it is essential to have that cultured sympathy with them which comes of sure knowledge."

These last words, "cultured sympathy which comes of sure knowledge" sum up what I want to say on this part of the subject. All missionaries presumably go to the heathen with some amount of tender emotion; compassion for their helplessness, pity for their degradation, or a more or less sentimental feeling. These are but weak and transient compared with the deep fellow-feeling which is born out of full knowledge.

8. Eugene A. Nida, *Customs and Cultures: Anthropology for Christian Missions* (New York, 1954), pp. 250-251.
9. E. W. Smith, "Social Anthropology and Missionary Work," *International Review of Missions*, XIII (Oct. 1924), p. 519.

. . . A study of social anthropology is the father and mother of that cultured sympathy which comes of sure knowledge.

. . . All this is an argument for studying native life and thought; but, it may be asked, is it an argument for missionary students studying social anthropology as part of their training? How can it be possible for any lecturer to teach all the customs and beliefs of all peoples to any class of students? At some of the lectures organized by the British Board of Study for the Preparation of Missionaries, thirty students may be present who are going out to perhaps a dozen different fields; complete instruction for them would involve, not only something approaching omniscience in the lecturer but almost individual tuition. But just as it is possible to impart the principles of phonetics to men and women intended for lands so diverse as China, India and Africa, so it is possible to teach the common principles of social anthropology to a class, because underlying all diversities there is a general similarity among the customs and beliefs of backward peoples.

. . . At the very least the students can be placed in the right attitude of mind and shown the lines of approach and be given hints as to future study. If they can have specialized training in the life of the actual people to whom they are going so much the better.

In view of the large percentage of graduates of our Christian colleges and Bible schools who go to foreign mission fields,¹⁰ if anthropology constitutes the all-important science for missionary training indicated above, then its existence as a major emphasis in the curricula of such schools is virtually demanded.

III. Liberal Arts Values: Interdisciplinary Integration

A unique characteristic of anthropology is that its essential subject matter embraces portions of the physical and social sciences as well as the humanities. Physical anthropology, of course, with its traditional concern with problems of evolution and race, is very closely allied with geology, osteology, and biology; cultural anthropology, with its concern for the various aspects of human society, makes much use of sociology, comparative religion, jurisprudence, economics and technology. And one needs but to mention anthropology's concern with comparative and descriptive linguistics, and primitive art, music, and folklore, to see the relationship of the humanities with the "science of man."

On the course level, many overlaps exist—largely limited, however, to subject matter and not to approach or treatment of it. For example, both sociology and anthropology involve principles of social organization and social dynamics—a concern with institutions and their interrelations. But whereas sociology's concern is largely descriptive, anthropology's is comparative; where sociology's is socially, or "institutionally" oriented, anthropology's is culturally oriented—concerned with aspects of culture rather than primarily with structure of society. And where the sociologist's concern is with his own society, the anthropologist's is chiefly with the cultures of others.

Many Christian schools are beginning to recognize the need for at

10. Over 11% in one liberal-arts college; much higher in Bible colleges and institutes.

least one course in anthropology. Usually this is offered by a teacher trained in one of the other social sciences or by one trained in Bible, or in many cases, a returned missionary. This means that often the subject is being taught (a) in connection with a major in another field; (b) by a teacher who is not trained in anthropology; or both. I would not want to discourage the inclusion of anthropology in a curriculum under these conditions in schools which cannot do otherwise. But while there exists a large area of common ground to cover, together with many common problems to study which can be handled respectively by the social scientist, the theologian, or the missionary, nevertheless the approach, treatment, and goals of other disciplines are only merged with those of anthropology on the level of the college curriculum at the expense of the distinctive contributions of one or both. William Howells makes this very clear when he observes that courses in anthropology "should ideally be taught by an anthropologist rather than by, say, a versatile sociologist, for teaching the materials of anthropology and treating these materials with the essential viewpoint of anthropology are two different things."¹¹

It really makes relatively little difference, if anthropology does not constitute its own exclusive department, just what department it is combined with. Throughout the country anthropology is combined departmentally with various fields. At Columbia Graduate School, anthropology is with psychology under the Faculty of Political Science. Other working combinations find anthropology with archaeology, sociology, missions, or apologetics. Probably in a Christian school a Department of Anthropology and Missions would be ideal. If such a department cannot be established at once, the missionary emphasis lies closest to the social science courses, rather, even, than to the Bible department. Again it is a case of approach and the primary concern with cultural rather than theological matters.

Let us then examine anthropology's social science and residual components with reference to their value for the Christian curriculum.

William Howells calls anthropology "the most general of the social sciences." But more than this, some unique characteristics of anthropology, as a liberal arts pillar are indicated in his further statements that it is not merely the science which is the gathering point of the other social sciences; it is both a social and a natural science, and is *the* present science of man.

Its integrative qualities for the student, no matter what his major interests are, prompt Howells to urge its adoption into the "small liberal arts colleges" as "the kernel of social science." He points out that

in these very years universities are constantly instituting programs which, whatever their exact form, have as their purpose the unifica-

11. W. W. Howells, "The Study of Anthropology," *American Anthropologist*, LIV (1952), 7.

tion for undergraduate students of that material usually known as the required courses, or the courses for distribution, and normally meant for the freshman and sophomore years. It is here that anthropology, having undergone a natural process of integration itself, finds an opportunity to serve, in partnership with the basic humanities, as the catalyst of a humanistic interest in all the other subjects, particularly social.¹²

Along these same lines, Professor Kroeber has also indicated anthropology's unique position in a social science setting. While he points out that "the prevailing placement of anthropology in contemporary American universities is in the social sciences," he also adds that this is likely to be favored by administrators because "social science is easily adapted to mass educations, and in research it largely avoids the problems of expense set by maintenance of laboratories, collections, and work in distant fields."¹³ Now if anthropology were to assume *only* the proportions of a social science, then its adoption by and combination with a sociology or other social studies major as merely a supporting field should be the natural organizational solution. But notice Kroeber's next observation: "There is also a widespread assumption by the public at large and among students that the social sciences have practical value and are directly useful. Such a claim can hardly be made for knowledge of fossil man, early prehistory, native languages, primitive customs, or culture history" — *except* in the curriculum of a Christian school whose special concern in this regard is with the whole matter of antiquity for apologetics, and primitive language and culture for missions! Because of this unique "practical value" which exists for Christian education, anthropology more than ever should be considered not merely as a branch of social studies but in terms of its broader applicability to the well-prepared Christian graduate.

Another very significant contrast is shown by the difference in the number of undergraduate anthropology majors in proportion to the total enrollment in secular schools, as compared with the proportion existing at Wheaton College, which had the only undergraduate major program in a Christian college up to 1957. At Brooklyn College, for example, with a laytime undergraduate enrollment of approximately eight thousand students there is a "small number of anthropology majors, seldom more than ten at any one time. . . ." ¹⁴ At the University of Utah with an enrollment of nearly 900 in undergraduate anthropology courses alone in 1953-54, there were only six majors, and only nine for the year 1954-55. At Wheaton, on the other hand, with a total undergraduate enrollment of only 1600 students there have consistently been between a dozen and 25 anthropology majors. The vocational concern with missions is the obvious answer to the difference.

2. Howells, pp. 4, 6.
3. A. L. Kroeber, "The Place of Anthropology in Universities," *American Anthropologist*, LVI (1954), 767.
4. Ehrich, p. 359.

However, let me hasten to point out that the secular schools by no means have proportionately smaller departments. Brooklyn College had four and Utah had seven full-time anthropologists (at the time of the above report) to Wheaton's one. The reason for this is a most important and fundamental factor in the role anthropology plays in the liberal arts curriculum as was suggested by Kroeber and Howells above. Robert Ehrich puts it this way "Anthropology as a subject has much to contribute to the non-professional student in attitude, point of view, methodological attack, and manner of approach, and . . . it can effectively supplement the work of other disciplines in helping the student to shape his personal philosophy" (pp. 357-358). He further points out that "anthropology *per se* can contribute much in the way of material, insight, and attitude to students whose major fields are in other departments" (p. 359). Howells called it the "catalyst" of the sciences of humanity. Ehrich says that "by virtue of its amorphous nature, anthropology allows for interdisciplinary cooperation . . ." (p. 357).

How is this revealed by these departments in secular schools? At Brooklyn College "there is sufficient student demand to maintain eight different advanced courses that are classed as strictly anthropological in nature" (Ehrich, p. 359). At Utah in 1954 there were 922 students enrolled in 36 anthropology course sections. Thus one of the chief values of anthropology as an integrative discipline is strikingly revealed. If it is such for the secular student, it should be recognized as having the same value for Christians.

Our Christian colleges would not think of being without such traditionally major departments as English, history, and mathematics. These are vital to provide basic tools for educated Christians to use in any walk of life. The offerings of psychology and sociology, chemistry and physics, music and public speaking, among others, are only slightly less generally applicable in their contributions to graduates in other fields.

Christian colleges are concerned with producing *Christian* graduates and to that extent the college program must be considered "vocationally" oriented even within a broader liberal-arts context. In other words, an anthropology major in a "liberal arts" education for the Christian cannot be completely non-vocational in general any more than that of education majors, pre-meds, or music majors. Nevertheless, we can agree with Ehrich that anthropology "does provide a natural co-ordinating medium within the objectives of a liberal-arts education" (p. 362) and as such, involves concepts and skills which are *vital* to the well-educated Christian.

This presentation is only an introduction to the values and characteristics of the anthropological contributions to liberal-arts education. Time and space prevent more than passing mention of such aspects as the values

of linguistic insights into other languages and modes of thought; the importance of the basically historical orientation of American anthropology; the relevance of the functionalist point of view for the educated Christian; not to mention other valuable integrative emphases upon religious, political, economic, and geographical considerations.¹⁵

15. Further references which the author has used include Robert W. Ehrich, "The Place of Anthropology in a College Education," *Harvard Educational Review*, XVII (1947), 57-61; Theodore McCown, Wm. Duncan Strong, C. F. Voegelin, Z. S. Harris, William N. Fenton, Eliot D. Chapple and Margaret Mead, "Symposium: The Training of the Professional Anthropologist," *American Anthropologist*, LIV (1952), 313-346; *Report of the Department of Anthropology to the Dean of the University College* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1955); and E. W. Voegelin, "Anthropology in American Universities," *American Anthropologist*, LII (1950), 350-391.

AESTHETICS AND CHURCH MUSIC

ARTHUR F. HOLMES

Religious music is an expression of religious thought and experience. The music of the Christian church is intended to express redemptive experience and the worship of the Redeemer-God. Being rooted in the truest and noblest thought and experience, it should itself be of the finest and noblest quality. It should be worthy of Divine worship, not only in its verbal content, but also in its artistic form: for music is an art, and if God merits the best music he merits the best art in music.

The purpose of this article is accordingly to suggest the bearing on church music of certain concepts drawn from aesthetics, the philosophy of art. Two problems are involved. First, what is art and how may we evaluate it? By "art" is meant, of course, the broad scope of the fine arts which include music. Second, what is the aesthetic experience one enjoys when he contemplates the beautiful and how is it related to religious experience? It should be quite apparent that this second question depends on the first, for our aesthetic experience will be conditioned by what we expect of an art-work. If we expect an exact copy, we are not likely to respond very appreciatively to impressionistic art.

Art, we suggest, involves several factors. First, art is a means of communication, for we invariably ask, "What is it?" or "What is he trying to say?" Second, artistic communication involves subjective modulation, interpretation. The artist does not speak literally, he speaks symbolically, emotively; he interprets. He speaks, not out of superficial experience, but from the depths of his personality. The factors which mould his personality mould his music, be they physical, temperamental, or spiritual; be it suffering and disillusionment, or love and joy; his culture, his religion, his moral values—all of these are liable to find their outworking in the artistic

expressions to which a personality gives birth. Music arises from the whole personality, an integration of physical and moral and intellectual and emotional and religious factors. And music makes its appeal to a similar integrated personality in its listeners.

In the light of this subjectivity, how may we evaluate art? Are there any objective criteria of aesthetic judgment? Is there a distinctively Christian appraisal, in terms of our distinctive moral and religious commitments? Let us approach this by distinguishing between intrinsic and instrumental values.

Intrinsic values are inherent in the thing itself; they are good in themselves. Instrumental values are good as means to higher ends. Now in art, two intrinsic values may be recognized—sensory and formal. The sensory values concern the component elements—in painting, color, shape, etc.; in music, tone, pitch, and so forth. Formal values concern the organization of these component elements, by contrast, movement, etc., into orderly, unified works. When, as in verbalized music, two arts are combined (music and poetry), it is possible to have artistically bad words set to artistically good music, and vice versa. The badness of one mars our enjoyment of the other. Yet even if both poetry and music are good by themselves, the combination may be artistically bad, if they seem to communicate different ideas or even the same ideas with different overtones of interpretative feeling.

It is possible to enjoy aesthetic experience purely in relation to these intrinsic values. We must not for a moment take away from the genuineness of such experience. But when we think of church music we are not thinking of a pure art abstracted from all other considerations. We are thinking of an applied art, one in which the intrinsic merits of the music derive additional merit from their instrumental value. In fact, it is only when we abstract art from its culture, and separate the artistic life from the whole of life, that we can afford to neglect instrumental values. For an art both reflects culture with its morality and religion, and influences culture. We need, therefore, to evaluate art both intrinsically and instrumentally. And we need to define aesthetic experience in relationship to both.

What, then, is aesthetic experience? What is its distinctive nature, in so far as it is possible to abstract this from its larger context of instrumentality? Clearly it is not religious experience, although this may be interwoven with it. Nor is it moral experience, although firm resolve may result from it. Rather, aesthetic experience begins with a pleasurable contemplation, involving both intellect and emotions, of sensory and formal values, and in the concentration of this enjoyment one experiences something of a detachment from other concerns. There is a release from other pressures. The contemplation becomes disinterested and impersonal in the sense of interest and attention being captivated. One is

"carried away" by the music from the things which previously absorbed attention, such as personal fears and desires. Good music captivates and elevates the soul. But it is not the music alone which makes this possible. The aesthetic sensitivity of the person involved is important; this is why we have music appreciation courses; we seek to develop the individual's sensitivity. It may be observed that the image of God in man accounts for his uniqueness, and so for his aesthetic abilities. Lack of aesthetic sensitivity would then seem to arise from an underdeveloped image — the man is not stewarding the potentialities God has given him. But it may also arise from a distorted image due to the effects of sin on the human personality. There is considerable truth to those words:

Heaven above is softer blue,
Earth around is sweeter green!
Something lives in every hue
Christless eyes have never seen.

The Christian should appreciate true beauty and good art more than the non-Christian of comparable aesthetic maturity.

Let us now try to place aesthetic experience in its wider contexts and turn our attention to the instrumental values it involves. For our purposes two values will suffice. We shall call them communication and concentration, and immediately they emerge from the preceding discussion. By communication we allude to that function of art in which the artist tries to express his own reactions to some idea, value, or situation. That communication is instrumentally valuable is self-evident; it is true that what the artist says is going to affect how he says it; the message should govern the material of the music. But it is also true that it will affect the aesthetic experience, perhaps by stirring emotions or suggesting thoughts, perhaps by the use of associations. At any rate, I become enthralled not just with sensory and formal values *in themselves*, but rather I enjoy these as the materials and techniques skillfully and effectively employed in saying something that is worth hearing. If the message is not worth hearing, the work, though intrinsically good, will have little instrumental value. In church music, where the instrumental value is so important, it need not be employed.

By "concentration" we mean the focusing of thought and attention by means of the art employed. Feelings may be aroused, and that experience of detachment may occur. From the instrumental viewpoint the question is: What does this experience mean to me? It may mean that I gain serenity of mind. It may mean I delight in the unity which a piece portrays. Here some mood is set, or some commitment reiterated. Here are suggested certain values and attitudes. Whatever the object of concentration be, for better or for worse, it will leave its imprint on the

personality. Consequently the art-work may be adjudged in this light, by the impact it has on the soul. When my reaction as a moral being involves me in moral attitudes and acts, a moral evaluation of art is legitimate. If I am caused to concentrate on themes of religious significance, such as universal chaos or the sublimity of harmony, then some religious evaluation may be legitimate. For whether we like it or not, music does set a mood, it does stimulate emotions, it does have moral and religious involvements. And aesthetic experience in its broader significance takes these into consideration.

This introduces the crucial question, that of *the bearing of aesthetic experience on religious experience*. What is religious experience? To make the question more specific and relevant, let us ask, "What is the worship experience?" *Worship* is a recognition of Who God is, and a consequent adoration of God for what He is. We adore Him for being gracious, wise, holy. The worship experience includes this recognition and adoration, but more. As *experience* it brings the worshipper into the presence of this God Whom he adores. Deeply conscious of His presence I prostrate myself in humility, devotion, dedication. I am filled with awe and reverence and overwhelming gratitude; for see Who He is — and He is here — and He has done all this for me!

If this is the worship experience, how does it differ from the aesthetic experience? First, the object of the worship experience is not an art-work, not an idea beautifully expressed; it is God. But observe what the two experiences, *as experiences*, have in common. In both I am "carried away," I forget my mundane concerns, I go out refreshed and elevated and even recommitted.

The fact that there are common elements should make us wary. It could be — and often is — that we mistake aesthetic experience for religious experience. The fact that music makes people feel good, arouses joy, produces smiles, need not mean that the Holy Spirit is at work manifesting His presence. The fact that I go away with new courage and resolve need not mean that God has spoken to me. Subjective feelings — what we have called concentration — may not safely, or even psychologically, be separated from objective factors — what we have called communication. The strength I derive from worship comes from God, from being in His presence and there being reminded of certain relevant truths. Artistic communication, reinforced by concentration, is one means the Spirit of God employs in worship. But let us not confuse the means with the end.

How can this be avoided? How may aesthetic experience contribute to genuine religious experience? In broad outline, the answer is plain. Make the communication clear; do not obscure it with bewildering ornamentation. Say what there is to be said and say it expressively, beautifully,

meaningfully, powerfully. Keep always in mind the instrumental values that are paramount in church music. Concentration should be on God; communication should be about God. Then we will bow humbly in His presence and worship Him, not the art or the artist.

At times the possibility of confusing the aesthetic and the religious has led to an avoidance of art in worship as a detraction. But, in the first place, art is unavoidable. The preacher's homiletic skill is art; even the simplicity of a humble chapel is art; all music is art. We want it, then, to be good art. In the second place, it *may* be a liability (especially if it is bad art or if it obscures what it should communicate). But it *should* be an asset. God has made us aesthetic creatures. Art and aesthetic experience are His gifts. The emotions they stir and the mind they stimulate are God-given. They should therefore enhance the message. They should help us to recognize the presence of our God, and to bow in adoration, renewing our vows.

By way of illustration, it may be noted how the use of music in corporate worship enriches one's experience. The composer expresses his subjective response to certain objective truths or values. The performers in turn interpret with expression this composition. The worshippers then respond to the performers' expression of the composer's expression. This sharing enriches perspectives and adds color. It enhances the worshippers' appreciation of the truth communicated and the God adored.

This is easy when we confine ourselves to communication. But what about concentration? Inevitably this mood-forming detachment will arise. How is it conducive to true worship? As we worship, our minds wander, our attention and feelings are haphazard. The Spirit of God uses means to focus our attention and captivate our thoughts. He uses artistic means to turn us from the things of earth to the things above. By our appreciation of sensory and formal values, He holds truth in focus. He elicits that intellectual and emotional response which is fundamental to both the aesthetic and the religious experience. For I am constrained—I identify myself with this which I hear—with the truth and with the pathos of it, with the values and experience of the artist.

One last emphasis: Aesthetic experience, we have seen, is conditioned by aesthetic sensitivity. Religious experience, we recognize, is conditioned by spiritual sensitivity. The artist, therefore, as well as the worshipper, must be in good spiritual condition—the one in order to apprehend and express properly the message he conveys; the other in order to respond fully and appreciatively in harmony with kindred minds. Without aesthetic sensitivity we can still have worship, impoverished though it may be. But without spiritual sensitivity there can be no worship at all.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

The Philosophy of Science, by Henry van Laer. Pittsburgh: The Duquesne University Press, 1956. xvii and 164 pp. \$3.75 bound, \$3.00 paper.

The book under review is the first of a two-part analysis of science, its methods and its grounds, from a neo-Thomistic point of view. It forms a part of the Duquesne Philosophical Series which bids fair to provide for the English speaking world the finest introduction to contemporary Roman Catholic thought in a wide variety of areas readily available. Certainly van Melsen's *From Atomos to Atom* and *The Philosophy of Nature* and van Laer's earlier *Philosophico-Scientific Problems* will for some time be the standard sources for reference to current neo-Thomistic discussion in the area of science. Taken along with *Science in Synthesis* published four years ago as a dialectical seminar report by the Dominican House of Studies in River Forest, Illinois, they provide must reading for anyone interested in a Christian approach to empirical endeavor.

In this volume, van Laer explores science in general in anticipation of the second part which will "be concerned with the problem of the division of the sciences and the proper nature of the various groups of the sciences." It analyzes the meaning of science (inclusive of mathematics, philosophy, and even theology) and the roles of abstraction, necessity, method, induction, hypothesis and theory, and demonstration in this discipline. As can be seen from the broad scope of the discussion there is a typical scholastic flavor of synthesis and structuring. This is, of course, opposed to the physicalist tendencies of many modern scientific philosophers who will not consider theology or metaphysics in the same realm of discourse as propositions about natural science. But it is akin to them in the positivistic emphasis on physics as clearly revealing the typical features of all human knowledge experimentally ascertained (xv).

As an introduction to science this book should provide much help to any student interested in organizing his thoughts on the subject. After a general course in one of the sciences in college, it should aid in clarifying the meaning of that science, but the reviewer feels sure that many will feel that beyond first courses in science the credibility of the discussion will fall off inversely as the degree of scientific attainment and sophistication increases. This is because modern theoretical work and its tools of analysis are heavily predicated on hypotheses of mental constructs rather than on the Aristotelian hylomorphism of this work. One could, naturally, revise these on the basis of an affirmation of the existence of a material realm of being but most scientists will see this as a loss of historically hard-won gains. To them, van Laer should have stopped with the emphasis on the

validity of logical thought and its place in weaving together the many strands of human experience. There is no need to anticipate an understandable unity of the external world, let alone to metaphysically orient science as the study of matter.

In general the discussion maintains a high level of clarity and rigor. The reader is taken through the maze of concepts in a well-explained and interesting manner. This is not to say that he will not feel certain areas are analyzed superficially. Logic is not taken beyond the traditional subject-predicate form and the great value of relational and multi-valued logics is not even mentioned. One has also an uncomfortable feeling, often felt in conservative Protestant works also, that there is a parochialism in the reference material. References beyond Thomism are certainly missed here. The author does mention briefly and critically several opposing positions at a few points, but apart from the insufficiency of these or the need to refer to the earlier work on *Problems*, there is the implicit assumption that the only realistic epistemology is that of Aristotle—and that without mention of the difficulties many have found in it. Causality, coherence, essence, the "universal judgments or statements which . . . possess a character of necessity because they express an ontological relation which the formal abstraction has discovered to exist in things" (23), the basis of mathematics in formal abstraction, and the role of necessity in logic and causality are never made satisfyingly apparent.

Like van Melsen the author stresses what is called the "species-individual structure." This is assumed to be a necessary idea for any science, i.e. that there exist like external things which act in a similar fashion, so that a particular case may be universalized to all cases of its type. While only partly true even at the trivial level of dropping stones to measure their acceleration it is manifestly not true that scientists generally recognize this as essential. In class logic a class of one member is not made identical with the class and in application in cosmology the universe and in theology the uniqueness of revelation (even for the Catholic) are not treated as beyond scientific analysis. Of course one can go so far the other way, as in some operationalistic writers, as to assume the uniqueness of every scientific analysis or measurement to the extent that any organizational law should become meaningless. Surely the problem implies more subtlety than this traditional discussion or the crudities of some scientists.

One could say much more. The value of the book to the reviewer lay just in this stimulation. We will wait to see whether this new effort can really integrate the scientists in any widely acceptable manner and whether it will aid in the advance of scientific work. Science has generally operated with Aristotelianism on its head—from the particular experiential situation

to the more embracing and not from the general to the special case. Whatever the metaphysical grounds might be for preferring the latter, experience has led scientists the other way. They don't like nature neatly bundled and organized before they are led by the evidence to tie the strings. We await too, some conservative Protestant discussion. It is easy to criticize but what have we contributed?

—Thomas H. Leith

The Loyalties of Robinson Jeffers, by Radcliffe Squires. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1956. x and 202 pp. \$4.25.

Of the "three great poets" produced by twentieth century America, Eliot, Frost and Jeffers, Radcliffe Squires writes, "Each of these is a thinking man, responding to the same central question of his age: What is the destiny of man?" (152) Revealed in this work is a poet who is, in nearly every respect, an opposite of Eliot. Calling Eliot a Humanist, Squires then labels Jeffers the Inhumanist—a poet shrinking from the failure of humanity and constructing a doctrine based on science and nature to take its place. It is part of Jeffers' solution to the problem of sin.

The book, by itself, is valuable for the insight it gives to a way of thinking which has been influenced by, but has rejected, Western Christianity. Lance Fraser's dilemma in *Give Your Heart to the Hawks*, says Squires, "is perhaps Jeffers' own. He rejects formal dogma but seems to stagger under the weight of a Calvinistic belief in the depravity of man. And in spite of the fact that for Jeffers there is no eternal life, heaven, or hell, his characters, "riddled with guilt, expect punishment for their crimes in an after-life. Aware, then, of their guilt, they cry out for a fiery cleansing" (89ff.). But for Jeffers, punishment for sin must develop in this life.

All of this serves to help explain the "religious intensity" of his writing, and shows itself in the violence and suffering which he records in his poems. As late as 1951 he writes, in *The World's Wonders*,

It is easy to know the beauty of inhuman things, sea, storm and mountain; it is their soul and their meaning.

Humanity has its lesser beauty, impure and painful; we have to harden our hearts to bear it.

Earlier, in *Going to Horse Flats*, he had written,

Man's world is a tragic music and is not played for man's happiness, Its discords are not resolved but by other discords.

It is at this point that Jeffers offers a solution, clearly delineated by Squires, which leads through the suffering and away from the mind centered in humanity, to the solace and splendor of inhuman things and the peace of the desert of the soul. It is here that Radcliffe Squires makes clearest the difference between Eliot and Jeffers. Eliot finds spiritual drought in the desert of *The Waste Land*, but Jeffers finds spiritual fullness by casting off

humanity and turning to the beauty of things. Here also he finds God in the desert, but only after he has ceased to look at man.

Concerning the style which Jeffers uses, Squires presents an eminently fair account of a "poet whose reputation within a relatively short time has risen very high and fallen very low" (vii). He recognizes the basic reasons for this, and in writing this book, he performs a task which certainly needed doing, since Jeffers—who, like so many other twentieth century poets has caught the profoundly troubled spirit of his time—in his concern for the destiny of man in a decaying civilization, has made "the first major poetic attempt to bring the split of the modern world together in a primarily materialistic vision" (190).

We must agree with the writer that Jeffers' solution is, unfortunately, no solution, but that his effort is a major one which cannot be overlooked.

—Ann D. Ferguson

Taboo, by Franz Steiner, with a preface by E. E. Evans-Pritchard. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. 154 pp. \$4.75.

The author, a Czechoslovakian, lectured briefly in the Institute of Social Anthropology at Oxford University before his sudden death in 1952. This volume includes some of his lectures at that time. Its interest to our readers lies in its subject; one which plays a role in our debates on Christian liberty and in a much deeper sense is of great religious significance to the theologian and the missionary.

The author has absorbed completely the British "sociological" approach, being an even more orthodox Oxonian than his master Evans-Pritchard. Consequently it contains acid criticism of various other anthropological and psychological trends and schools as tested by the cross-section made at the central idea of taboo. Social anthropology is presented here as the genuine scientific expression of the British Commonwealth, and "foreign writers and tendencies" are dismissed perhaps because they do not fall in the great tradition of the Royal Anthropological Society. He shows little sympathy for our "cultural" anthropology, and even less for such outstanding psychologists as Wundt or Freud. One will appreciate the special British flavor, and also understand it better, by reading e.g. the *Social Anthropology* of Evans-Pritchard published in 1954 by The Free Press of Glencoe, Illinois.

One facet of the problem of taboo is the concept of holiness. Yet omitted from mention is the classic by Rudolph Otto: *The Idea of the Holy*. We are here particularly interested in the author's attitude to the Hebrew *qodesh* and *chol*. The root *q-d-sh* means "separate" but we connect with this word other associations than the Hebrew. God is the "Separate" rather in the sense of Otto's "Holy Other." The Hebrew term suggests "separated

to" rather than "separated from." It refers to a relationship. Anything related to God becomes *qodesh*, but God Himself is never called so unless in relation to man, some place, or object. The word *chol* is translated as "common" or "profane"; it refers to things which are non-*qodesh*.

Neither do we share the opinion (p. 83) that Acts 10: 14 is confusing the "common" and the "unclean." We prefer to accept them as equated. The "social" anthropologist would not find it so difficult if cultural and psychological viewpoints would enter his considerations. Linguistic instances illustrate this shift of meaning: from the Holy to the Prohibited, from the Prohibited to the Unclean, and from the Unclean to the Common and Vulgar. Prohibited taboo expressions appear as obsessive repetition in the vulgar speech.

An interesting book which requires other balancing readings!

—Theodore T. Thienemann

Hymns and the Faith, by Erik Routley. Greenwich, Conn.: Seabury Press, 1956. xii + 311 pp. \$6.00.

Erik Routley is one of England's leading hymnologists and the author of several studies of hymns, hymnody and music. A minister of the Congregational Church, he serves as lecturer, tutor, librarian, organist and chaplain at Oxford. *Hymns and the Faith*, originally published in Great Britain, was a recent selection of the Religious Book Club.¹

When the reviewer read the RBC's notice of this book, his first thought was that here was another "quaint stories of beloved hymns" sort of thing. It was a pleasant surprise, therefore, to encounter this scholarly, judicious book. Enough has been written, Routley thinks, on the origin of hymns; he writes on the hymns themselves, treated as works of art which have something to say. There are those, of course, whose appreciation of "Rock of Ages" will be greatly heightened by the knowledge that Augustus Toplady wrote it during a severe thunderstorm, while taking shelter under an overhanging rock. But others will derive greater benefit from the hymn if they know something of the meaning of the Hebrew phrase on which it is based, of the use of the Rock as a symbol throughout the Bible and especially as a figure of Christ, and of the meaning of the Biblical teachings of sin and forgiveness with which this hymn is concerned. It is for the latter group that *Hymns and the Faith* is written.

The book treats forty-nine hymns, arranged to cover in an orderly fashion the entire gamut of basic Christian doctrine. Thus, apart from any relevance to the hymns, it may serve as an interesting commentary on the Creed. But this is no academic exercise. The author has made a constant

1. 76 Ninth Avenue, New York 11.

effort to render these doctrines meaningful to the ordinary churchgoer of today. The result — as with his compatriots C. S. Lewis and J. B. Phillips — is an easy, conversational style, yet one that is carefully polished. And the style is a fitting vehicle for numerous profound and pointed observations.

For any for whom often-sung hymns tend to become matters of routine, this book is invaluable. Even this student of literature too frequently forgets that the great hymns were written by living men and women with full-orbed Christian faith and experience, out of which the hymns grew, and that to fully appreciate them we must not be satisfied with our own meager associations but search for all the richness of meaning and experience which their authors condensed into the stanzas they gave us. This book is a reminder and an aid toward that appreciation. — *Charles A. Huttar*

The Sources of Catholic Dogma, by H. Denzinger, translated from the 30th edition by Roy J. DeFerrari. St. Louis: Herder, 1957. xxxiv and 653 and 67 pp. \$8.50.

Any student of the Roman Catholic faith is acquainted with Denzinger's well-known collection of decrees and definitions of faith entitled *Enchiridion Symbolorum*. It presents in a most convenient form in chronological order the dogmatic decisions and definitions which have authority in the Roman Catholic Church. The 30th edition, revised by J. Bannwart, included 2333 + 6 paragraphs, carefully selected and indexed, the Latin text being given throughout, and the Greek original being supplied in the case of decisions taken in the East. Now this very valuable reference work has been made available in English through the industry of Dr. DeFerrari, and admirably published by Herder. The Roman Catholic will therefore have here in his own tongue an extensive statement of the official position of his Church. The Protestant believer is here supplied with an eloquent and melancholy evidence of Rome's increasing departure from the simplicity of the New Testament faith, a departure so far-reaching in modern times that it led to drastically anti-evangelical positions (cf. Council of Trent, Mariology, etc.). — *Roger Nicole*

The Vatican Revolution, by Geddes MacGregor. Boston: Beacon Press, n.d. xiv and 226 pp. \$4.95.

A minister of the Church of Scotland with degrees from Oxford, Edinburgh and the Sorbonne, now professor of philosophy and religion at Bryn Mawr, the author has essayed an objective study of the Vatican Council of 1870, its setting in history and its import for Christians, both Roman and other, and for the world, with special reference to America.

The book opens with a vivid picture of the Council itself, followed by

the pertinent recent history which formed its background, and by a presentation of the drama, on- and off-stage, which marked its proceedings. The fourth chapter analyzes and refutes the Roman Catholic explanation of the opposition to the proposed decree on papal infallibility, leading to a discussion of the technical meaning of "ex cathedra" (which reduces the idea of infallibility to an absurdity). Between come two chapters, one on the democratic tradition which the author finds in medieval scholasticism, the other on the subsequent flight from democracy, from the Council of Trent on through Jesuit machinations for the perfection of an authoritarian, totalitarian system.

The closing chapter, on "The Issue in Modern America," begins with two pages which are an eye-opener for Americans, showing the rosy hopes of hierarchically inspired Roman Catholics for a Roman Catholic America. Perhaps the rest of us have not adequately realized the magnitude of Roman Catholic contributions to the history of North America.

The qualified idea of democracy in medieval scholasticism is of a piece with that of King John's barons, enshrined in Magna Charta. Without the Protestant Reformation, it would demonstrably have withered ere it emancipated the masses. This and every salutary idea in the New Testament depends on men dedicated to the will of God in Christ for their implementation.

This book underlines the ignorance on the part of Protestants of the real strength of Roman Catholic piety, enriched by mighty rivers of tradition. Too often neither do we understand their wealth of genuine religious resources, nor do we know how to open and offer to them the greater though simpler wealth of our Christ-centered, Biblically inspired Christianity. "O wad some Power the giftie gie us, to see oursels as ithers see us." Not Pergamum, Thyatira and Sardis alone are in danger: too lazily Laodicean to answer Christ's knock, lacking the Smyrna martyr stamina and having left our Ephesian first love for our brother Christians—not forgetting Roman Catholics—we find our Philadelphian "little strength" unimpressive beside the sensuous pageantry of Rome. Not that we need more pageantry: we need the indwelling strength of Christ Himself.

The book concludes with an adequate bibliography and an index of names rather than of ideas.

—Emmet Russell

Trial Balance, The Education of an American, by Alan Valentine. New York: Pantheon Books, Inc., 1956. 283 pp. \$4.50.

This book is the self-disclosure of a twentieth-century American at mid-passage. Written by an intellectual who achieved distinction in collegiate studies, university administration, and public service, it is, as the title sug-

gests, an effort to assess the factors—formal and otherwise—which comprised his education. In fact it was the inter-relationship of his collegiate studies and his vocational experiences which apparently prompted the author to write this book.

After a liberal education at Swarthmore and Oxford, he engaged in administration at Swarthmore, Yale and at Rochester, where he served for fifteen years as president. From such a background the author advances his observations of higher education. As might be expected his analysis is disquieting for it confirms the skepticism of many thoughtful college graduates concerning the comprehensiveness, vitality or relevance of their education. His confession at the conclusion of his administration at Rochester pointedly illustrates the difficulty which attends the efforts of those who attempt to rectify known defects in higher education. Fortunately the task is not impossible, for some of his convictions relating to over-specialization, inordinate stress upon things material, divorcement of religion and education, and the moral and ethical contradictions of institutional policy have been understood and put into practice by a significant number of American colleges.

There is a sense in which the author's critique fails to take into account the inherent limitations of formal education. Such education of necessity is somewhat anachronistic, for it largely treats of what has already happened and in general reduces these phenomena to static proportions or statistical data. Hence it is improbable that it can ever adequately prepare students for the future despite incidental evidences of prophetic vision occasionally manifest on a college campus. Even the development of techniques of scholarship presupposes a common denominator to which not all students will correspond. Moreover, the maturing process which generally takes place when a student is in college makes unlikely the optimum utilization of facilities or full exploitation of opportunities available in higher education. Even the vital and stimulating experiences which so often are the only residuum of a college education are not guaranteed to all nor possible in every case. The author views higher education, moreover, from a perspective to which it made a significant contribution. Here again the eminence of maturity makes lesser heights seem inconsequential or faulty, but to the participant below they quite possibly may be indispensable to development and progress. Most of all, higher education is inextricably linked to the social and cultural preparation for it, particularly as this relates to the home. In the case of the author, his sturdy Quaker background seemed—despite its alleged limitations—to have been vital to his later success.

In considering his education in the crucible of public life, the same issue is revealed. Of his experiences in World War II he could say that these were more rewarding than any books or courses. The question is

whether they would have been as rewarding apart from the preparation afforded by books and courses. When formal education is viewed as an end, subsequent educative media appear to be superior ends. But if formal education is a means, then it can become an indispensable prerequisite—despite its limitations—in the achievement of worthwhile goals.

That the author's rigorous training in scholarship and his intimate acquaintance with the ideals of the university world were vital in shaping his outlook is demonstrated in the latter part of the book where he describes his experience in government service. Here he is less of a chronicler and more often pauses to give trenchant analyses of current issues. It is to the credit of the author that his earlier education, including his home background, was not inundated by his experience in government and that he left Washington pessimistic in outlook but unchanged in his basic convictions. In fact, this encounter with amoral political opportunism caused him to see that "successful integration among men depends on successful personal integration within separate men." As an inductive conclusion, this statement illustrates the degree to which the trial balance of this American thinker effectively corroborates the quality of his many-sided education.

—Hudson T. Armerding

The Meaning of Americanism by Robert N. Beck. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. xii and 180. \$2.50.

For his effort subtitled "An Essay on the Religious and Philosophic Basis of the American Mind" the author, clearly a well-read scholar, won the Philosophical Library Essay Prize (\$1000) for 1956. With the increased interest in intellectual history a number of attempts have been made to analyze the American and his tradition.

The point of view espoused is a reflection of Edgar Brightman, under whom Beck studied: namely, a theory of "democratic personalism." The American is presumably an idealistic "social atom" with a strong bent toward individualism. The author freely admits that many of his ideas come from Reinhold Niebuhr (*The Irony of American History* and *The Self and the Dramas of History*) and T. V. Smith (*The American Philosophy of Equality*).

We will agree with Mr. Beck when he says, "There is value in fixing attention on ideas and ideals" (146), but we come to the parting of the ways when he suggests a return to the idealism of Hegel, Green and Bradley (141) and we cannot accept his rejection of an absolutistic ethic. If one agrees with this latter point of Mr. Beck he has cut himself off from any true foundation and cannot consistently with the author "take respect for personality." We hold that personality is grounded only in the biblical

view of God and man. It is at this point that we see the chief defect in the author's point of view, i.e., his attempt to circumvent the American heritage grounded in supernaturalism. Dr. Beck may not like supernaturalism but he should not avoid it in its historical context.

Although printed in exceedingly small type there is real value in the well-done index. Here too is evidence of the author's familiarity with his subject — e.g. the inclusion of Edwin Mims and James Wilson. One may disagree with Beck's thesis as to the Meaning of Americanism but for stimulation of thought and readability one also must agree with the judges of the essay contest.

— C. Milburn Keen, Jr.

He That Cometh, by Sigmund Mowinckel, translated by G. W. Anderson. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1956. xvii and 528 pp. \$6.50.

This is the first of Sigmund Mowinckel's books to be translated into English, and it opens up to the student not able to read German or Norwegian the vast scholarship of one of the best known and most influential of modern Biblical scholars. This is a particularly good book to form the introduction to Mowinckel for it is not only an important work but an excellent example of his thorough scholarship and lucid thinking and writing. The Norwegian edition, *Han som kommer*, was published in 1951.

The purpose of the book is not to examine the meaning of the term "Messiah" for Christ or Christianity. It is 'intended only to lead up to the message of Jesus about the Son of Man, to show the presuppositions behind it and to present the developments of the various factors, and the form in which they lay ready to be used, transformed, and fitted into a new unity by Him' (445). In Part I he deals with The Future King in Early Jewish Eschatology. Mowinckel limits the use of the term "Messiah" to eschatology, and that in the absolute sense of "the last things." Any passage that does not deal with "the last things" he does not consider Messianic. This, of course denies the strictly Messianic character to many Biblical passages long accepted as such and indeed applied in the New Testament to Christ. Mowinckel's thesis is that the hope of early Judaism, by which he means pre-Exilic, was not that of a Messiah but of an ideal king. It was national, political and definitely of this world. Included in this ideal, along with historical persons such as David, are old mythical ideas taken by the prophets to express their thoughts and hopes. With the Exile and the longing for restoration the hope is intensified. Then, as under Zerubbabel the restoration is found to fall far short of the hoped for glory, the conception becomes more and more religious. It begins to lose contact with concrete historical reality and turns to the thought that not man but Jehovah must be the Redeemer. With this Israel had come to true Messianism.

As a sort of prophecy *sui generis*, Mowinckel considers the Isaianic Servant of the Lord to be apart both from the earlier and later ideas. In a very excellent chapter he finds here the conception of Messiah as the prophet, suffering and dying for the sins of the people. This "far surpasses everything in the Old Testament message about the Messiah (the future king), his person and his work" (255). Since the thought is too alien and too profound it "had, broadly speaking, no influence on the Messianic conception in the Old Testament and Judaism. That influence is first seen in Jesus" (256).

In Part II, The Messiah in Later Judaism, Mowinckel considers the Messiah of the extra-Biblical apocalyptic. This has two aspects, a National Messiah who is the logical sequence of the earlier ideal king, and the Son of Man. This latter is held to be a genuinely Messianic term, and Mowinckel does a masterly job in dealing with this long-disputed definition. He finds that both the National Messiah and the Son of Man are thought of as unique and eternal but not divine. He stresses the fact also that "in the entire apocalyptic literature there is not a single passage which suggests that it is part of the vocation of the Son of Man that he must suffer and die to atone for the sins of man" (410).

The value of these studies for an understanding of both Old and New Testaments is unquestionable. That they are to be used with discretion is also unquestionable. Although Mowinckel speaks of revelational history, there is very little indication that the Messianic ideas are more than the ideals, hopes and desires of men expressed in more or less figurative fashion. He draws little distinction between Persian myth, Old Testament Scripture and apocalyptic pseudepigrapha. All alike express man's concept of the Messiah. Jesus takes these ideas and uses the terms with a new meaning to express his own consciousness of His person and work.

The greatest value of the book is that it brings one into contact with the Messianic conceptions of Jesus' own day, against which the truth as it is in Christ must be understood. The tensions, antagonisms, misunderstandings and rejection of Jesus by those to whom He came, will be far better understood and appreciated.

—Philip C. Johnson

Is There a Conflict Between Genesis I and Natural Science? by N. H. Ridderbos, Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1957 (Pathway Books). 71 pp. \$1.50.

Dr. N. H. Ridderbos (from a family of Dutch Reformed scholars and successor to Dr. G. Ch. Aalders) gives us simply and directly his interpretation of Genesis 1 and 2. He rejects such traditional interpretations as the literal day theory, or day-period theory (usually associated with concordism

or the harmony of the day-periods with the geological column), or the gap-theory. He offers the *literary framework hypothesis*. It was advocated prior to Ridderbos by Noordtzij and to be sure may be found in both Catholic and Protestant writers of the last hundred years in variant forms.

The purpose of Genesis 1 and 2 is to affirm the absolute Creatorship of God, to show the ultimate rootage of the Sabbath, and to lay deep foundations in creation for the election of Israel and the salvation of Jesus Christ. Accordingly the author of Genesis uses a literary device to convey these truths. He takes the six days and divides them into two sets of three days each. Four creative acts are assigned to each set of three days and there is a remarkable parallel between the two sets.

It may be asserted that Ridderbos adopts certain positions which would be considered *avant garde* by American orthodoxy, and that he is closer to continental and Catholic thought than he is to American orthodox thought. For example, he says that we cannot say anything positive about the author of Genesis 1, the present literary form of the chapter is from a post-Mosaic period, the gradual literary growth of Genesis 1 is not to be rejected *a priori* (17); and Genesis 1 and 2 represent two different centers of transmission but were put together by the editor of Genesis and are to be taken as a unity (28).

With reference to hermeneutics he states that we are to proceed *from* revelation *to* science but adds two qualifications: (1) God does not ask us to ignore science, and (2) if our interpretation of Genesis seems to be at odds with science it suggests that there might be something wrong with our interpretation. Although this is neatly theologically guarded nevertheless Ridderbos has said in so many words that the interpreter of Genesis must make his peace with the various sciences.

Is there any science in Genesis 1? Yes, and again, no! Genesis 1 is not a scientific argumentation but a prologue for the election of Israel. The record is anthropomorphic rather than simple history, and its classifications are not to be taken rigidly. Its arrangement is primarily topical and *not chronological* and Ridderbos deals at some length with the matter of biblical historiography showing that for certain purposes the Scriptures occasionally give us compressed topical summaries of events, rather than scientific chronicling of the same. If Genesis 1 be interpreted as giving us a scientific chronology of events then there is a clash between the orders of Genesis and those of geology, e.g., the problems created by the second and fourth days. Further we must be prepared to admit some of the language of the ancient *Weltbild* ("world picture") occurs in the Genesis account as well as some imprecision of language. Furthermore, there is little sense in the effort to harmonize the days of Genesis with the epochs of geology (concordism).

On the positive side Ridderbos finds little natural science in Genesis 1. Although we cannot dogmatize what God may or may not include in his revelation apparently God has not chosen to give us much natural science in Genesis 1. We do have: creation *ex nihilo*; a rebuttal of materialism and pantheism and superstition which lays the foundation for the investigation of nature; and the unique status of man.

The two major problems of science and Genesis are: (1) the problem of death before sin. He suggests that we must not read too much in the word "good" and imagine an idyllic condition before sin which the writer did not intend. (2) The problem of man's vast antiquity as suggested by anthropology and to which he says Calvinistic thinkers must give immediate attention.

If there is any criticism it would be this, that it is hardly proper to raise the serious problems of the book without the more extensive exposition which they demand. If the reviewer may put in a personal word it is this. It should prove a bit disconcerting to some of the sharper critics of my own work on Scripture and science to discover that there are so many parallels between my views and those of a man who writes from the citadel of continental orthodoxy.

—Bernard Ramm

Thales to Dewey: A History of Philosophy, by Gordon Clark. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1957. 540 pp. \$5.00.

Written as a college text by the well-known Conservative philosopher at Butler University, this book follows in the fine standards set by earlier studies such as *A Christian View of Men and Things* and his section in Martin, Clark et al., *A History of Philosophy*. The author is particularly at home in Greek philosophy, but here he has moved through to the modern period with the incisiveness and wit evidenced in his many articles and reviews in the area of his specialty. This reviewer anticipates a wide use of this volume in Christian colleges because of its explicit thrust from their point of view and in many other schools for its insight and clarity. Indeed, in combination with W. T. Jones's *A History of Western Philosophy* an unbeatable team, even if from widely divergent interpretations, is formed for analysis and source reading for a first course.

Complementing the actual analysis is an excellent selected bibliography of secondary works on the periods and individuals under review. There is also a thorough index of terms and names. There are relatively few footnotes (as there should be in an introductory work) but they are at the bottom of the page rather than at the back which is helpful. The book is well printed and reasonably priced.

Having made these general remarks, let me be specific in several in-

stances. Clark points out in his preface that the book is frankly epistemological in what it stresses. The problem of knowledge being today more widely discussed than metaphysics makes this emphasis contemporary in tone, but it is a little odd to find a student introduced to philosophers he knows vaguely for other reasons discussed without mention of these. Most students know Plato, for instance, first for the political theory of the Republic but this is not discussed. One volume cannot, of course, do everything well but this is one reason for complementing Clark with another more typical text. This suggestion is not peculiar to the book under review; it should be done for any text at the introductory level so as to offset biases in emphasis or viewpoint.

As a consequence of the epistemic color of the work, the reader will find some of the finest and most succinct evaluations of facets of this problem exhibited by varied thinkers or schools that he is likely to find in any general manual — including often those of Windelband or Ueberweg. This is not to say that he will agree with all that is written, for Clark writes with absolute idealistic leanings (a point where a metaphysic apparently going beyond that in Scripture is more fundamental than the problem of knowing). He writes too from a rather narrow, to this reviewer at least, view of language and logic. In the discussion on Aristotle, for instance, the way we think and the formalization of this with an implicit ontology are not sufficiently distinguished. Were Clark better to understand the pragmatic function of systematized thought as in modern logic and science the reviewer might feel more affinity to the criticisms Clark expresses in certain metaphysical passages and in discussing the modern philosophers than he is sure really exists below apparent agreement.

Let me finally state, that whatever be this reviewer's real disagreements with Clark at many points, he finds Clark's writing unusually stimulating for a text of this type. Although a spectrum apart in philosophical color, Bertrand Russell and Clark are alike in their brilliant, if somewhat eccentric and overstated, analysis. For those who like their philosophy with zest and life and without the inclusiveness and drabness of the usual introductory manual, this book should find as enthusiastic a following in Christian circles (whatever the disagreements) as Russell's volume has found at large even among his critics.

—*Thomas H. Leith*

Revivalism and Social Reform, by Timothy L. Smith. New York: Abingdon Press, 1956. 253 pp. \$4.00.

At long last a scholar has appeared who unapologetically writes social history from a conservative Christian point of view! A number of evangelicals (see various statements issued by Gordon College, Wheaton College

Westminster Theological Journal, *Christianity Today* and *Gordon Review*) have held that conservative or fundamental Christianity has had a greater social impact than many modern scholars are willing to admit. Few have demonstrated it in serious study or scholarly production. Dr. Smith has examined an aspect of the American church scene in the years 1840-1865 and has concluded "that revival measures and perfectionist aspiration . . . drew together a constellation of ideas and customs which ever since have lighted the diverging paths of American Protestantism. That his aim "to get the facts straight" has been accomplished will be seen from the extensive and chiefly contemporary sources which he uses repeatedly. The book is also a tribute to Harvard and A. M. Schlesinger, a dean of American social historians, because of the standards demanded of sections of this book written as a doctoral thesis.

After examining the general Protestant situation in the period to be studied the author shows the increased emphasis upon revivals which culminated in that of 1858. He then examines the results of such revivals. Among these he suggests an enlarged role for laymen as church leaders, first indications of an ecumenical movement, new stress upon ethical values and doctrinal changes. Chapter X, "The Evangelical Origins of Social Christianity," states the real thesis of the book. Other chapters of interest are those on "The Holiness Revival at Oberlin," "Sanctification in American Methodism," "The Gospel of the Kingdom" (on William Miller) and two chapters on the slavery issue.

One trusts that Mr. Smith will not be so absorbed in pastoral and denominational duties that he will not find time to continue his writing. Those of us teaching American church or social history await his next publication. Abingdon Press is to be commended for publishing this story of mid-nineteenth century America.

—C. Milburn Keen, Jr.

New England Saints, by Austin Warren. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956. 192 pp. \$3.75.

What have Cotton Mather, Jonathan Edwards and their contemporaries in common with a Unitarian like Channing, a Transcendentalist like Emerson, a Swedenborgian like Henry James, Sr., or a Buddhist like Irving Babbitt? All these are included together among the "saints" of this book; "my spiritual ancestors and kinsmen," Professor Warren calls them (179). The bond which unites them is this: that all are men "to whom reality was the spiritual life" (v): men who lived and walked in the spirit. Surely the mystical outlook makes strange bedfellows!

One is tempted to inquire what value there can be in a work whose unity, whose central thesis in fact (if it has one) is built on so tenuous a connection.

Austin Warren, professor of English at the University of Michigan, is a distinguished literary critic and historian. He has written well on Pope, Henry James, Sr., Hawthorne, Crashaw and literary theory, to mention only his book-length subjects. But *New England Saints* is not literary criticism. It is an account of the author's own spiritual pilgrimage. It is a series of portraits which become in composite the "portrait of the artist." It is "a hagiography, designed . . . primarily for edification" (v). It is a religious tract, a personal testimony to the values of a certain way of life and an attempt to win converts.

The reader who hopes to find here the critical insight of Warren's other works will be disappointed. Indeed the suggestion of an essentially uncritical approach, which Warren invites by calling the book "hagiography," is borne out by a number of careless factual blunders such as the reference on p. 183 to the *Bay State* [sic] *Psalm Book*. Scholarship, then, is not one of the book's values—nor is it meant to be.

But suppose the book does win a convert—someone who decides that he agrees with Warren's emphasis on the "spiritual life" and would like to live accordingly. What precepts does the book offer him? Is he to associate himself with the Church, as did the Puritan heroes of the first two chapters, or eschew any such institutions, a course which Warren applauds on pp. 48-49, 94 and 159? Does spiritual discernment consist in a vivid literal awareness of the after-life, such as that for which Michael Wigglesworth is praised (10-11), or—diametrically opposite—a denial of the "crude" Christianity of rewards and punishments (51-52, 59, 123-125, 186)? Even among the non-Christian saints of Warren's calendar there is no agreement as to the implications of his religion. Should we rely with Emerson on the intuition, or insist with Norton that "we need the wisdom of the reflective and rational understanding, not that of the intuitional" (133)? The systematic presentation of a philosophy of life, then, must also be ruled out as a possible value of this book.

However, it is not as though Warren were blind to the ambiguity and contradictions inherent in his system. In one place (157) he even speaks of the "schism" in the teaching of one of his saints. And it was another of them, Emerson, who refused to be disturbed by self-contradictions, who scorned "a foolish consistency." Warren would have it this way. With approval he quotes Henry James the elder: "I am anxious to conciliate your heart primarily, while your head is quite a subordinate aim. . . . Truth, to every soul that has ever felt its inward breathing, disowns all outward authority. . . . The only witness it craves . . . is that of good in the heart" (88-89).

With the idea of the heart's witness to truth the Christian finds considerable sympathy. This is the doctrine set forth in Romans 8: 16 and

I Corinthians 2: 14, to mention two obvious passages. Insofar as *New England Saints* reminds us of this truth, herein lies the book's value. And it can so remind us, even though the general tenor of the work may be non-Christian. What we see is not an utterly false doctrine but a Christian teaching distorted, misapplied and isolated from other elements in Christianity which put it in perspective.

One might well say of Austin Warren what he said of Charles Eliot Norton (142): "He was far more indebted than he knew to the religion which he rejected."

— Charles A. Huttar

SURVEY OF SIGNIFICANT ARTICLES

THOMAS H. LEITH

- Advancement of Science*, March. C. B. Goodhart, "World Population Growth and its Regulation by Natural Means."
- American Scholar*, Spring. Gunnar Myrdal, "Trade and Aid" and E. Fuller, "The New Compassion in the American Novel." In the Summer issue J. H. Wheelock writes on contemporary poetry.
- Biblica*, 1957. S. Lyonnet, "Notes sur l'exégèse de l'Épître aux Romains."
- Bibliotheca Sacra*, April. Gordon Clark, "The Bible as Truth."
- Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, April. Adler, Polanyi, and Frank discuss science and philosophy.
- Catholic Biblical Quarterly*, April. J. T. Forestall, "Christian Revelation and the Resurrection of the Wicked."
- Christian Century*, May 22. S. Ahlstrom, "Neo-orthodoxy Demythologized."
- Christian Graduate*, June. M. A. Jeeves, "Modern Psychology and the Validity of Christian Experience."
- Christianity Today*, April 29. Ned Stonehouse, "Pathos of Religious Liberalism." On July 8 G. E. Ladd and O. T. Allis appraise the R. S. V. and Carl Henry writes an article on Neo-Orthodoxy, following previous articles on Liberalism and Fundamentalism.
- Concordia Theological Monthly*, April. David Schuller, "Labor, Industry, and the Church."
- Confluence*, Spring. A forum on education today, here and abroad. Reinhold Niebuhr, Eric Weil, Arthur Brodbeck, and Jacques Leclercq are among the contributors.
- Current History*, May. Deals with Integration: the south's historic problem. In June the world of Islam is discussed.
- Diogenes*, No. 17. Wladimir Weidlé, "Biology of Art."
- Eternity*, May. Bernard Ramm, "The Revolution in Theology" and a discussion of public versus Christian schools. In June Ramm writes on the major theses of Neo-orthodoxy and J. F. Walvoord has, "What's Right About Fundamentalism?" Ramm writes again in July on Karl Barth.
- Ethics*, April. Daniel Cappon, "Punishment and the Person."
- Expository Times*, June. G. E. Ladd, "Eschatology and the Unity of New Testament Theology."
- Fortune*, June. R. W. Husband discusses what college grades predict.
- Hibbert Journal*, April. Articles are included on lines of approach to a Trinitarian ontology, philosophical implications of logical analysis, varieties of belief in reincarnation, and notes on the Vatican excavations and the tomb of St. Peter.
- Humanist*, No. 3. An issue on education in general and higher education in particular.
- Interpretation*, April. Gabriel Hebert, "Fundamentalism."
- Journal of Bible and Religion*, April. P. A. Bertocci, "Can the Goodness of God be Empirically Grounded?"
- Journal of Pastoral Care*, Summer. G. B. Blaine, Jr., "Religion and Psychiatry: Some Philosophical Observations."

Journal of Religion, April. Chas. Hartshorne, "Whitehead and Berdyaev: Is There Tragedy in God?" and L. C. Birch, "Creation and the Creator."

Journal of Religious Thought, Autumn-Winter 1956-57. W. A. Banner, "Christian Ethics and the Moral Life."

Journal of Southern History, May. L. R. Harlan, "The Southern Education Board and the Race Issue in Public Education."

Journal of Teacher Education, June. An issue on merit salary schedules for teachers.

Journal of the History of Ideas, June. M. Mandelbaum, "Scientific Background of Evolutionary Theory in Biology" and A. Ellegard, "Darwinian Theory and 19th Century Philosophies of Science."

Main Currents of Modern Thought, March. Edmund Sinnott, "Contribution of Biology Toward a Solution of Mind-Body Relationship."

Mind, April. Alan Donagan, "Explanation in History."

National Education Association Research Bulletin, February. A whole issue on the status of the American public school teacher.

New Republic, May 13. An issue on Communist China. On June 17 Robert Fitch writes a requiem to American philosophy. The July 1 number discusses the Supreme Court, Congress, and the Executive. On this, see also *U. S. News and World Report*, June 21 and 28.

New Scholasticism, April. J. Schall, "Culture and Religion" and Robert Faricy discusses Aquinas' fifth proof for God's existence.

Partisan Review, Spring. Sydney Hook, "A Secular View of Knowledge."

Pastoral Psychology, June. Margaret Mead, Paul Tillich and others discuss the immortality of man.

Philosophical Quarterly, January. M. Beebe, "Joyce and Aquinas: The Theory of Aesthetics."

Philosophical Quarterly, April. J. King-Farlow, "From 'God' to 'Is' and from 'Is' to 'Ought'."

Philosophy, April. W. B. Gallie writes about the British debate on capital punishment.

Philosophy of Science, April. K. W. Spence, "The Empirical and Theoretical Structure of Psychology." Also Chas. Frankel on explanation and interpretation in history.

Quarterly Journal of Speech, April. E. A. Kretsinger, "Television Training: Liberal Arts Versus Professional School."

Reformed Journal, March. Jesse De Boer, "Notes on Theological Language."

Reformed Review, April. Articles on the Kingdom and the state, the place of the covenant in Calvin's thinking, and the Christian faith and the academic disciplines.

Religion in Life, Summer. Articles on race relations and the American church. Also R. Stevenson on "Evangelistic Song."

Reporter, May 2. Dean Acheson, "Foreign Policy and Presidential Moralism." May 16, Paul Jacobs writes a lengthy article on atomic weapons and dangers in testing. On May 30 there is a discussion of educational T. V.

Review and Expositor, April. G. K. Schweitzer writes on the origin of the universe and the Bible. Other articles are on infant baptism and the preacher's use of poetry.

Review of Metaphysics, June. D. P. Dryer, "Metaphysics and Christian Faith."

Saturday Review, March 23. J. A. Gengerelli, "Psychoanalysis: Dogma or Discipline." March 30. J. Ciardi, "The Morality of Poetry." Paul Anderson writes on "How Social is Science?" on April 27.

School Review, Summer. John Mickelson writes on the effectiveness of the core curriculum.

Science, April 26. Anatol Rapoport, "Scientific Approach to Ethics."

Science News, No. 43. A. Q. Morton discusses a statistical analysis of the structure of the New Testament.

Scientific American, July. Walter Emery, "The Tombs of the First Pharaohs."

Scientific Monthly, July. Arthur Pap discusses modern semantics as related to traditional philosophy.

Scottish Journal of Theology, June. Wm. Lillie, "Faith and Baptism." The March number had an article on the church and science.

Theological Studies, June. C. Vollert, "Origin and Age of the Universe Appraised by Science."

Theology, May. I. T. Ramsey, "The Logical Character of Resurrection Belief." In June, G. F. S. Gray writes on modern humanism.

Thomist, April. Articles on the philosophy of history, the philosophy of Christian Science, and Thomistic theories of sensation and metaphysics.

Union Seminary Quarterly Review, March. Articles by Buber on prophecy, by Holmer on Kierkegaard and theology, and by others on religion and teaching and religion and the arts.

Victoria Institute Transactions. This spring articles have appeared by C. D. Curling on "The Influence of Science on Ideas of the Universe," by G. D. Kilpatrick on "The Transmission of the New Testament and Its Reliability," by M. A. Jeeves on "Psychology and Religion—a Retrospect and Prospect," and by J. C. Harris on "Heaven in the Hebrew Tradition."

World Dominion, April. Eugene Nida, "Problems of a Translator."

Yale Review, Spring. L. Barrett, "Teacher Training and the Liberal Arts." In the summer, H. Morgenthau writes on paradoxes of nationalism and J. Summers discusses Milton and the cult of conformity.

An additional item is that Dr. Thienemann of the Gordon faculty has written a lengthy article on the Oedipus problem in the *Psychoanalytic Review* of January. Originally offered in the seminar of the Honors Program at the college, it is a novel approach to an old question.

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(Continued from page 94)

For the *Review* Mr. Buswell has prepared a revised version of an article which appeared in *Practical Anthropology*, November-December, 1955.

Among our reviewers . . . Thomas H. Leith heads the Division of Sciences and Mathematics at Gordon College. Hudson T. Armerding is Dean of the College and Professor of History, and Ann D. Ferguson is Instructor in English and Fine Arts.

Emmet Russell is Pastor of the Union Church at Short Beach, Connecticut. Bernard Ramm, whose *The Christian View of Science and Scripture* was published in 1955, is Director of Graduate Studies in Religion at Baylor University. Roger Nicole is Professor of Theology at Gordon Divinity School.

C. Milburn Keen, Jr., heads the Department of Political Science at Gordon College, and Charles A. Huttar the Department of English Language and Literature. Philip C. Johnson is Professor of Bible at Gordon College.

Notes . . . *The Gordon Review* welcomes learned articles on all subjects, particularly the liberal arts and sciences, relating to the Christian philosophy and witness. On most matters of style *The MLA Style Sheet*, rev. ed. (1954; Modern Language Association of America, 6 Washington Square North, New York 3) is followed. . . Demand for the first issue of the *Review*, February, 1955, has far exceeded the supply. Readers who are not keeping a file of this publication would greatly oblige by returning their copies for others who want them. If within traveling distance, let us know where we can pick them up.